In this paper, we build upon our previous work investigating roll-call behavior and partisan effects in lame-duck sessions of Congress. We utilize a variety of data and tests to examine House party leaders' agenda construction strategies and House members' roll-call participation rates across regular and lame-duck sessions of Congress in the pre-20th Amendment era . Consistent with our findings from previous work, party leaders appeared to construct more moderate and less divisive agendas in lame-duck sessions, which reflected leaders' reduced ability to influence the behavior of departing members. The ability of party leaders to exert pressure in lame-duck sessions did not disappear, however, but rather took a different form: that of getting returning members to participate actively on roll-call votes. Our analyses of members' roll-call participation across congressional sessions reveals that departing members significantly increased their abstention levels in lame-duck sessions, while returning members significantly decreased their abstention levels.
Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the 20th Amendment in 1933, the U.S. Congress was governed by a peculiar institutional arrangement. Like today, there were typically two sessions, but the sessions themselves were structured differently. The first, or long, session convened in December, almost 13 months after the prior November elections, and stretched into late spring or early summer. The second, or short, session also convened in December, after the elections to the next Congress, and stretched through the Congress' official end-date of noon on March 4. This discrepancy in the timing of long versus short sessions, which harkened back to decisions made in the Confederation Congress and early years of the Federal Congress, created a potential agency problem in congressional representation: the short session was constituted in part by members who would be exiting the chamber (having decided to retire or having lost their reelection bids). These "lame-duck" members were unpredictable, as the electoral connection no longer tied them to their districts and the party connection was unreliable in keeping them firmly behind leaders' objectives. This made politics in the short or "lame-duck" session uncertainboth in terms of how members would behave and how leaders would set the legislative agenda.
Scholars working within the New Institutionalism paradigm tell us that structure matters; specifically, that the institutional context affects the choices that political actors make (Rohde and Shepsle 1978; Shepsle 1989; Aldrich 1995) . The pre-20th Amendment congressional environment provides a unique and useful laboratory to examine the New Institutionalist perspective. The two sets of sessions, comprised of different member types as well as different lengths and certainty of end-dates, offer just the contextual variation needed to investigate the effect of structure on behavior in Congress. For example, the different institutional settings associated with regular and lame-duck sessions should influence how often certain members participate, and when they vote, as well as how leaders choose issues and design an agenda. This paper represents an ongoing collaboration, as we seek to broaden our knowledge and understanding of congressional and partisan behavior by leveraging the distinctive elements inherent in historical lame-duck sessions. Earlier papers have investigated specific theoretical questions regarding member voting and elite strategy across regular and lame-duck sessions Nokken 2006a, 2006b) , and thus have been somewhat narrowly focused. Our goal here will be to step back a bit and provide a broader perspective on cross-session differences; rather than testing particular hypotheses, we will concentrate more on providing different takes on more general theoretical questions. We will explore a range of different data, both micro and macro, covering various aspects of both member and leadership behavior in regular and lameduck sessions; in doing so, we will examine how such behavior compares across the different legislative contexts.
Our primary interests lie in how cross-session contextual differences influenced two important aspects of congressional politics: the leadership's strategy in constructing a legislative agenda and the changing nature of party pressures. That is, we focus on how the shift from the pre-election regular session -comprised of members who will mostly seek reelection -to the post-election lame-duck session -comprised of both reelected members and departing members Similarly, we analyze a variety of measures of party unity and member participation across sessions, as well as across different types of agenda items, to evaluate the stability of party leaders' influence.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we draw upon our previous research explaining how the electoral and partisan connections change across regular and lame-duck sessions. We then analyze data from the 45th (1877-79) through 72nd Congresses to assess (a) the degree to which the nature of the legislative agenda in the House changed across the two institutional settings and (b) the implications such changes had on the responsiveness of House members to leadership pressures. We then summarize and discuss the implications of our findings, after which we conclude.
Agenda Construction, Partisan Pressures, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress
Despite being a regular part of the congressional calendar for nearly a century and a half, lame-duck sessions, until recently, have elicited little systematic scholarly examination.
Anecdotal accounts often suggested that lame-duck sessions were settings dominated by executive influence and congressional shirking, as departing members sought to trade votes in the hopes of landing an executive appointment or some similar form of post-congressional employment (Crowe 1969; Norris 1945) . 1 The few scholarly studies of roll-call behavior in lame-duck sessions concluded that departing members did not necessarily vote differently, they simply voted less often (Loomis 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Nokken 2007) .
A common refrain regarding lame-duck sessions was that they generated significant agency problems. With an often sizeable proportion of members departing the chamber in a few short months, having retired or lost their reelection bids, the representational dynamics in lameduck sessions were potentially quite precarious. To many, like Senator George W. Norris (R-NE), the mix of different member types (with their different incentives) in lame-duck sessions created a legislative setting that bred corruption, as vote trading and side payments between the executive branch and departing members was rampant. Indeed, Norris used such arguments effectively in finally eliminating the lame-duck session, via the 20th Amendment, in 1933.
Recently, we have begun a systematic examination of the politics of lame-duck sessions, focusing on a variety of topics including member voting, party pressure, agenda control, and agency issues Nokken 2006a, 2006b ). We briefly review some of our main findings below.
First, we investigated various arguments about "agency loss" in lame-duck sessions. The clearest such argument related to the severing of the electoral connection, and was the basis for
Norris' claims of corruption. Yet, despite Norris' strong rhetoric, we found no systematic evidence that departing members traded votes in return for executive branch appointments, nor did we find significantly higher levels of presidential support among departing members (Jenkins and Nokken 2006b ). Agency issues potentially affected party leaders as well -in lame-duck sessions, departing members were freed not only from electoral constraints, but party constraints as well, making them significantly less likely to respond to leaders' arm-twisting efforts. We found that the proportions of pressure votes (see Cox and Poole 2002) varied predictably across sessions: there were a lower proportion of positive pressure votes and a higher proportion of negative pressure votes in lame-duck sessions compared to regular sessions (Jenkins and Nokken 2006a ). In regular sessions, when members were largely beholden to them, party leaders actively turned the screws, which resulted in positive pressure. In lame-duck sessions, when the distribution of members was mixed and included a sizeable group no longer beholden to them, party leaders responded with a "light touch," which resulted in negative pressure.
The elimination of the partisan connection for departing members carried with it additional implications for party leaders' efforts to craft a legislative agenda. A key component of such agenda control is "negative agenda power" -the ability of majority-party leaders to prevent issues from reaching the floor opposed by a majority of their members (Cox and McCubbins 2005) . We analyzed roll rates on final-passage votes across sessions and found that the frequency of majority-party rolls in lame-duck sessions increased prior to changes in majority control (Jenkins and Nokken 2006a) . We argued that such increases were the result of "strategic rolls," whereby the party leadership allowed bills to reach the floor that split the majority coalition but also minimized future policy losses by beating the incoming majority to the punch. More generally, we found that lame-duck sessions were often characterized by more consensual legislation (as indicated by lower minority-party roll rates relative to regular sessions), as majority-party leaders realized that they had a relatively weak hand to play.
We build on these findings by exploring in more detail the agenda strategies that party leaders adopted in lame-duck sessions of Congress. For example, we investigate a variety of factors that tap the content of the legislative agenda, such as the breakdown of vote types (party unity votes and negative and positive pressure votes) across sessions. Additionally, we explore the types of issues on the agenda to determine whether the issue-content changed systematically from regular to lame-duck sessions. While we note the important institutional differences between regular and lame-duck sessions, we do not have strong priors regarding the nature of the agenda across sessions. Based on our prior research, we might be somewhat inclined to expect lower levels of party unity votes in lame-duck sessions relative to regular sessions, assuming that party unity votes resemble a more common form of positive pressure votes.
In terms of members' roll-call voting behavior in lame-duck sessions, the most robust findings suggest that departing members simply vote less often (Loomis 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Nokken 2007 ). This may be so, but lame-duck members do not stop voting completely. While departing members certainly have fewer incentives to participate in lameduck sessions, they may still be induced to turn out on certain types of roll calls. For example, the larger literature on roll-call participation identifies various factors that help to explain when members are more (or less) likely to participate on certain votes. In particular, the likelihood of abstention increases when the matter is perceived to be of low salience (to constituents) and when a member is likely to be a part of the majority on the vote, especially if that majority is large (Cohen and Noll 1991) . Party leaders are not passive on this front either. Leaders pressure members to participate on roll calls, with minority leaders being particularly effective in this regard (Forgette and Sala 1999) . It is plausible that such factors may explain changes in participation across regular and lame-duck sessions generally as well as when lame ducks actually do show up to vote.
One of the questions we address in this paper is whether variation in member participation is a function of the nature of the agenda in lame-duck sessions. Implementation of the partisan agenda depends upon leaders' ability not only to get the rank-in-file to support the party's position, but actually to get members to show up and vote when it matters. Thus, it strikes us that the leadership's agenda construction strategies are closely tied to concerns about roll-call participation. As a result, we investigate roll-call participation for departing and returning members across a variety of vote types. This variation allows us to examine how different member types (i.e., departing versus returning members), with their different incentives, responded to party arm-twisting efforts.
Evaluating Agenda Construction Across Legislative Sessions
Our first set of analyses focuses on the content of the legislative agenda in lame-duck sessions. We investigate whether the change in the composition of House member types from regular to lame-duck sessions affected the agenda strategies employed by party leaders in the House. Lacking a direct measure of the legislative agenda across sessions, we utilize specific categories of roll-call votes to draw some conclusions about how leaders adapted to the postelection sessions in the pre-20th Amendment era (1877 to 1933).
We begin by identifying party unity votes -those roll calls in which a majority of Democrats voted in opposition to a majority of Republicans -over the 57 year span. If party unity votes tap into some aspect of partisan conflict, significant differences in the proportion of such votes may appear across legislative sessions. Likewise, the different categories of lameduck sessions -whether they precede changes in partisan control of the House or not -might also generate significant variation in the share of unity votes over time. To test for significant differences in the proportion of party unity votes, we perform difference of proportions tests comparing the relative frequency of party unity votes across regular and lame-duck sessions (a)
for the entire series, (b) separately for each Congress, (c) for sessions preceding changes in partisan control of the chamber, and (d) for congresses in which the majority party will retain control. Moreover, we adopt two-tailed tests, as we do not have a strong enough priors regarding the direction of change to incorporate one-tailed tests.
Our results are presented in Table 1 . Overall, party unity votes comprised 64% of all roll calls during this period, ranging from 45.1% (65th Congress, 1917 -1919 ) to 90% (58th Congress, 1903 . The percentage of party unity votes in lame-duck sessions nominally exceeds that of the regular session, 65.2% compared to 63.5%, but that difference is not statistically significant (p < 0.18, two-tailed test). On an individual basis, 12 of the 28 congresses exhibit statistically significant differences across sessions, with 7 of the 8 Congresses between the 57th and 64th (1915-17) reaching significance. A bare majority of the significant shifts (7 of the 12) reveal higher proportions of party unity votes in regular sessions. 2 We also found that lame-duck sessions preceding changes in majority control of the chamber exhibited significantly higher levels of party unity votes (70.9% vs. 64.7% in the corresponding regular sessions, p < 0.002, two-tailed test). Generally, we fail to find many meaningful trends in these results. The direction of changes across sessions splits relatively evenly for the entire series as well as for those congresses exhibiting statistically significant differences. The significant increases in party unity votes in lame-duck sessions preceding a change in majority control could indicate an explicit effort by the majority-party leadership to complete as much business as possible, hoping to reduce the demand for legislative action by the incoming majority, similar to our explanation of the strategic roll (Jenkins and Nokken 2006a) .
[ Table 1 areas appear, we believe they provide some indication of the specific policies structuring partisan conflict during this time. We then compared the relative proportion of votes across sessions, finding that the share held in regular sessions exceeded that of lame-duck sessions, 36% to 32.3% (p < 0.01, two-tailed test). On an issue-by-issue basis, we find statistically significant differences in 6 of the 11 policy areas, with the majority of those instances (4 of the 6) exhibiting a larger proportion of regular-session votes.
[ Table 2 about here]
The greater frequency with which important issues appear in regular sessions, consistent with our findings in previous research, suggests that the elimination of the partisan connection among departing members forces the majority-party leadership to devise a more moderate agenda in lame-duck sessions. This strategy of moderation is pursued to attract the votes of departing majority-party members and reduce the minority party's incentive to obstruct the process. As mentioned above, however, we do find that two policy areas are considered relatively more frequently in lame-duck sessions: those involving the judiciary and public works.
That public-works bills would appear on the agenda in lame-duck sessions is not a complete surprise. For example, we previously identified a public-works bill from the 47th
Congress as a "strategic roll," whereby the majority Republican Party allowed the matter to come to the floor for a vote, even though it passed over the opposition of a majority of
Republicans (Jenkins and Nokken 2006b ). Public-works bills could also be construed as "less partisan" in that they are the quintessential example of distributive or pork-barrel politics.
Including such matters on the lame-duck agenda may indicate the leadership's intention to complete business and wait for a more responsive majority coalition in the next session.
Likewise, it could indicate a strategy whereby the leadership utilizes the logrolling characteristics of public-works legislation to drive through other, less universalistic pieces of legislation. We leave investigation of this topic, however, for a future project.
Our initial exploration of agenda content across regular and lame-duck sessions finds few differences in the level of party unity votes, with the exception of Congresses in which lameduck sessions convened prior to an impending change in House majority control, when the outgoing majority leadership appears to adopt a more aggressive course in the hopes of enacting partisan legislation before ceding power. Though far from conclusive, these results are consistent with our assertion that the elimination of the partisan connection resulted in a setting in which party leaders frequently lacked the ability to "twist arms" and coerce rank-in-file members to toe the line and support important party prerogatives.
Party Pressure and Roll-Call Participation across Legislative Sessions
Perhaps the most common characterization of "lame-duck effects" with respect to rollcall behavior is increased levels of participatory shirking by departing members. Simply put, lame-duck members abstain from voting at statistically significant higher rates in their final days in office. Having decided to return to the private sector or having been repudiated by the electorate, they lack strong incentives to show up to vote. Increased absenteeism does not mean, though, that lame-duck members stop voting altogether. Indeed, the continued participation of departing members was one of the key reasons why Senator Norris lobbied for the elimination of the lame-duck session.
In this section, we analyze abstention rates across sessions in an effort to identify factors that might have led members to participate on roll-call votes in lame-duck sessions. Once again, departing members exhibit statistically significant increases in abstention rates in lame-duck sessions. In Congresses preceding a change in majority control, departing members' abstention rates increased from 34.6% in the regular session to 35.7% in the lame-duck session (p < 0.02, one-tailed test). When the majority would not be changing in the new Congress, departing members' abstention rates increased from 32.8% in the regular session to 37% in the lame-duck session (p < 0.001, one-tailed test).
[ Table 3 about here]
We turn next to returning members, and find a strikingly different pattern. Returning members increased their participation (i.e., decreased their abstentions) in lame-duck sessions.
Overall, the abstention rate for returning members was 31.7% in regular sessions and 27.4% in lame-duck sessions, a statistically significant difference (p < 0.001, two-tailed test). Looking at individual Congresses, we find 15 instances of significant changes, 11 of which indicate increased participation rates (decreased abstention rates) for returning members in lame-duck sessions. The pattern holds as well when we compare abstention rates across sessions in Congresses (a) preceding a change in party control and (b) when party control will remain the same. In Congresses preceding a change in party control, returning members' abstention rates decline from 35.6% to 28.6% (p < 0.001, two-tailed test); when majority control will remain the same, returning members' abstention rates decline from 29.3% to 26.8% (p < 0.01, two-tailed test). It thus appears that returning members compensate somewhat for the increased participatory shirking exhibited by the lame ducks. One possibility is that the party leaders increase their pressure on returning members not only to support the party position on votes, but simply to turn out at high rates. Given that returning members care about future benefits the party leadership can provide (committee assignments, privileged positions for their pet bills on the legislative calendar, etc.), they should be receptive targets for pressure -consistent with the decline in abstention-rate results above.
The differential turnout effects for departing and returning members across regular and lame-duck sessions is consistent with a story of party pressure influencing participation rates. If that is indeed the case, we should expect to observe the effect more clearly on specific subsets of votes. [ Table 4 about here]
Party pressure appears to be an important component of roll-call participation across sessions. To investigate this linkage further, we compare the average abstention rates across regular and lame-duck sessions for majority and minority party members, respectively. We are interested in whether the observed changes in abstention rates among departing members are being driven by a particular group of partisans, with the possibility that departing majority-party members abstain more in their final days in office. Results appear in Table 5 . In fact, majorityparty members exhibit no change in overall abstention rates across sessions, registering an average abstention rate of 28% in both regular and lame-duck sessions (p < 0.99, two-tailed test).
Turning next to the congress-by-congress results, we identify 19 instances of significant differences in abstention rates across sessions: 9 instances of significant increases, and 10 instances of significant decreases. For Congresses preceding a change in majority control, the outgoing majority-party members show no statistically significant differences in abstention rates:
27.2% in regular sessions vs. 27.9% in lame-duck sessions (p < 0.13, two-tailed test). Majorityparty status does not lead to a consistent directional change with respect to turnout, evident by the frequent instances of both increased and reduced majority-party abstentions across sessions.
Turning to minority party, we find that in direct contrast to their majority counterparts, [ Table 5 about Here]
Our aggregate-level analyses of abstention rates provide some useful insight into participation decisions in lame-duck sessions. As expected, departing members participated less frequently. Interestingly, though, returning members exhibited statistically significant increases in participation from regular to lame-duck sessions. Likewise, minority-party members tended to participate more frequently in lame-duck sessions. To explore these findings further, we specify a series of pooled, cross-sectional regression equations, spanning the 45th through 72nd
Congresses ; this allows us to examine individual-level changes in abstention rates across sessions. The dependent variable in these analyses is the difference in lame-duck and regular session abstention rates for member i in congress t (Lame-Duck Session Abstention Rate it -Regular Session Rate it ). This specification allows us to identify the direction of change, which is important as we have a strong expectation of increased abstention rates for departing members in lame-duck sessions.
We regress the specified dependent variable on dummy variables for members who retired and members who lost their reelection bids. Including two dummy variables to account for mode of exit allows us to capture their separate effects. We expect statistically significant and positive coefficients on both variables, indicating increased abstention among departing members in the lame-duck session of their final term. We estimated three versions of the model, results of which appear in Table 6 : an aggregate model (1), and separate models for majorityparty members (2) and minority-party members (3). In all three of the specifications, we account for time-specific (Congress-specific) and member-specific fixed effects. The coefficients on both the lost and retire variables are positive and statistically significant in all three models.
Additionally, we find that losing candidates abstain significantly more than retirees in models 1 and 3 (p < 0.0006 and p < 0.0445, respectively).
[ Table 6 about here]
To gain additional leverage on party influence and roll-call participation, we next analyze individual-level changes in abstention rates across sessions on party unity votes. We calculated the dependent variable in the same manner as in the Table 6 analysis, but used members' abstention rates on party unity votes specifically, instead of all votes. As before, we estimated the model on all members, and then separately for majority-and minority-party members with both time-specific and member-specific fixed effects. Again, we expect the coefficients on the lost and retire variables to be significant and positive across each of the specifications. The results, which appear in Table 7 , are consistent with those expectations, with statistically significant and positive coefficients on the lost and retire variables in each of the three models.
The effect is strongest among losing members of Congress, who exhibit significantly greater rates of abstention in relation to retirees in both the aggregate model (p < 0.0003) and the minority-party model (p < 0.014).
[ Table 7 about here]
These sets of analyses provide a fairly clear picture of significant increases in abstention rates for departing members and significant decreases in abstention rates for returning members in lame-duck sessions. To evaluate further, we now specify a series of regression models to predict the proportion of members abstaining on individual roll-call votes from the 45th through 72nd Congresses. The unit of analysis is therefore an individual roll call, and the data set is comprised of all the roll-call votes from the 45th through 72nd Congresses (for a total of 7,075 roll calls). We calculate two dependent variables: the proportion of abstentions among (a) departing members (Models 1 and 2) and (b) returning of Congress (Models 3 and 4), to allow for a direct comparison of the two sets of members. The independent variables capture important characteristics of the individual votes that are thought to influence participation. Our primary variable of interest is a dummy coded 1 for those votes held in lame-duck sessions, and zero for votes in regular sessions. We also account for a number of specific types of roll-call votes, creating dummy variables to identify party unity votes, positive party pressure votes, and negative party pressure votes. We also include a series of control variables, to account for factors that may influence the relative "costs" of participation. For example, we include a dummy variable coded 1 for votes that take place midweek (Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday) and zero otherwise. 4 We also include variables to account for the relative closeness of the vote, as measured by the margin of victory/defeat ((|yeas -nays|)/yeas+nays), and an outcome variable coded 1 for victorious measures and zero otherwise.
The results, presented in Table 8 , show that a higher percentage of departing members abstain on roll calls held in lame-duck sessions, as one would expect (columns 1 and 2).
Likewise, columns 3 and 4 reveal lower levels of abstention (increased participation) among returning members in the lame-duck sessions. Some interesting differences emerge when we look at vote types. Abstentions drop on positive pressure votes for both returning and departing members across all four specifications. The patterns, though, deviate across specifications on other vote types. In models 1 and 3, it appears both departing and returning members abstain less on negative pressure votes. When we control for the outcome and the margin of victory/defeat, the participation of departing members is not significantly different, while returning members show significant increases in abstention on such votes. Interesting differences also emerge on party unity votes. For departing members, the significantly lower levels of abstention in model 1 disappear, giving way to significant increases in abstention in model 2 when we control for the outcome and margin of the vote. For returning members, though, party unity votes produce lower levels of abstention across both specifications of the model, consistent with the argument that returning members retain a partisan connection unlike their lame-duck counterparts.
[ Table 8 about here]
Discussion
Our goal in this paper has been to conduct a series of exploratory analyses to gain a better understanding of how agendas and participation rates -both of which encompass important elements of party pressure -vary from regular to lame-duck sessions of Congress in the pre-20th
Amendment era. In terms of the partisan nature of the agenda across sessions, the analyses presented here mirror those from our previous works Nokken 2006a, 2006b ), where we found a less fertile environment for party pressure in lame-duck sessions relative to regular sessions. Stated simply, as departing members no longer share a strong tie to the party, they are less likely to be responsive to the leadership's requests for loyalty.
While changes in the nature of the agenda suggest leaders modify their strategies to match the mix of member types in lame-duck sessions, party pressure does not disappear completely. Our analyses show distinct differences in the abstention rates of departing and returning members across sessions. Not surprisingly, departing members vote less often (abstain more often) in lame-duck sessions. Returning members, however, significantly reduce their abstention levels in lame-duck sessions, and thus compensate somewhat for the participatory shirking of their departing brethren. Such changes may reflect a shift in leadership's strategy from whipping members into line generally (in regular sessions) to actively encouraging returning members to participate on votes (in lame-duck sessions). These results strongly suggest that investigations of roll-call participation in lame-duck sessions need to progress beyond a story of participatory shirking by departing members. Specifically, future studies must account for the increased participation of returning members in lame-duck sessions, and the mix of different categories of roll-call votes therein, in an effort to explain this dynamic. 
